BUENOS AIRES HERALD - El centenario diario porteño en idioma inglés publicó un reportaje a Victoria Basualdo, integrante de la coordinación del informe, que acá ponemos a disposición.
Victoria Basualdo is one of the first researchers in the country to have
focused on the role played by business leaders during the 1976-1983
dictatorship. She took part in the investigation that resulted in
Responsabilidad Empresarial en Delitos de Lesa Humanidad (Corporate
Liability in Crimes Against Humanity, available online at
Infojus.gob.ar), released by the Latin-American School of Social
Sciences (Flacso), the Centre for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) and
the Justice Ministry’s Truth and Justice Programme and the Human Rights
Secretariat days before Cristina Fernández de Kirchner ended her second
term in the presidency.
Basualdo welcomed the Herald at her office in the Flacso headquarters
in Buenos Aires City to talk about how business leaders operated during
the state-terrorism era.
Why do you think the role of business leaders during the last dictatorship has stayed in the dark?
The history of what happened during the era of state terror is
complex. It’s difficult to address these topics as you’re making
reference to hubs of economic power that not only played a key role
during the dictatorship but still have a prominent position now. We
could also add the role of the Church or of the Judiciary as those areas
that should be revisited.
Were there any companies that had particularly close links to the military government?
Definitely. Acindar is the iconic case. The president of the steel
manufacturer was José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz until the 1976 coup. It
suffered several instances of repression during the dictatorship and a
clandestine detention centre also operated within the plant. Its ties
were iconic not only because steel was strategic for the military but
also for organic reasons: the head of this company turned into the
dictatorship’s Economy minister between 1976 and 1981. He also led the
transformation that reformed the country’s economic structure.
And what about the rest of the companies?
We analyzed 25 companies in the report. Most of them were not only
linked to the repression of workers but also had organic links to the
military government. For instance, Ledesma sugar producer, whose owner,
Carlos Pedro Blaquier, was not only a close friend of Martínez de Hoz
but also one of the business leaders who was part of the design of the
military coup. In the case of the automakers, they used to have a
commercial relations with the military as suppliers. Ford workers told
investigators about huge meetings held within the plant to pay tribute
to the Armed Forces.
Do you think the role played by union leaders should be revisited?
Examining the role of the unions is fundamental. Throughout our
investigation we came across some clues that indicated some leaders or
unions were involved in repressive processes. It was not the goal of our
investigation to focus on that, but we don’t believe that business or
labour should be thought of as a homogenous fields.
Is there evidence that business leaders intended to discipline workers as a way to boost profits?
Looking for an automatic correlation is a mistake. In the report we
analyzed the case of the pottery companies that ended up bankrupt. As it
is an error to analyze the history as a monolithic struggle between
business leaders and unions, there are cases in which disciplining
workers did not result in a positive evolution for the company.
You only examined one media company, the Bahía Blanca newspaper La Nueva Provincia?
But not as a media company. The two workers killed were from the
printing plant. We should think of media as sectors crossed by labour
relations, not only by their ideological role.
In 2006, you released a groundbreaking paper on corporate
complicity, but now the report says that investigation should focus on
the responsibility of business leaders. Has there been a shift?
We investigated the involvement of business leaders in the repression
of workers. There is a continuity. In that paper in 2006, it was said
that there was a need to compare and contrast different cases in search
of a pattern. Cuentas Pendientes (a book released in 2013 by Horacio
Verbitsky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky) also made reference to the
corporate complicity. But when you analyze 25 different cases of
companies and you find that there were clandestine detention centres
operating in five of them or that business leaders participated in
abductions, you can see the magnitude of the whole process. This report
is just a starting-point and an attempt to rebuild the history that was
silenced, the one told by workers and unions.
How did the political context influence this new perspective?
This is an effort at aggregation. In 2006, the CTA umbrella union
asked me to prepare a paper that had their appearance before Spanish
judge Baltasar Garzón in the late 1990s as a precedent. But at that time
it was thought that business leaders were responsible for the 2001
crisis and the process started in the mid-1970s came to an end with the
meltdown. So to understand what happened in 2001, it was necessary to go
back to the dictatorship era. Those who seemed to be the winners in the
1970s were also the winners in 2001.
Do you think you will be able to deepen these investigations?
We will continue investigating because we think these topics are
decisive. The repercussion of these topics with the new government will
be different.
There are some clues about this new era. For instance, the
ruling party has opposed the creation of a bicameral commission to
investigate business leaders...
Absolutely or the president — who took office on the International
Day of Human Rights — made no reference to human rights. The PRO party
has never vindicated this process.
@lucianabertoia
CV
Born: February 2, 1975
Position: Researcher at Conicet and at Flacso’s Economy and Technology Department.
Studies: History (UBA), MA, MPhil and PhD in History at Columbia University (New York)
Newspapers: As many as I can
Last book read: Latin America after the Financial Crisis, by Juan Santarcangelo, Orlando Justo and Paul Cooney.
Position: Researcher at Conicet and at Flacso’s Economy and Technology Department.
Studies: History (UBA), MA, MPhil and PhD in History at Columbia University (New York)
Newspapers: As many as I can
Last book read: Latin America after the Financial Crisis, by Juan Santarcangelo, Orlando Justo and Paul Cooney.
[link]